# Review dimensions

Work through all six. For each finding, record severity, location, the problem, the
evidence, and a concrete fix.

## 1. Claim-evidence integrity

Trace every headline number to its source and confirm it matches (see
`claim-evidence-map.md`). Specifically:

- The synthetic exactness taxonomy: six applications, `max_error` 0, 128-bit
  ciphertext sizes 262,282 / 1,310,882 / 2,621,791 bytes, 5× and 10× premiums.
- The real-genome studies (Section 11): E5 mean absolute AF delta ≈ 0.0609; E6 max
  F_ST-like 0.1363 and 624 suppressed rows; E7 recovery rates (1.000 under
  min-N-20, 0.000 under freeze, 0.125 under query budget 5); E8 exact product
  moments and max `r2` 1.0000.

Flag any value that does not match, any transposed digit, and any table whose rows
disagree with its cited CSV/JSON.

## 2. Security analysis (Section 9)

- Confirm the coverage matrix (Table 4) and the per-attack catalog agree: every
  threat in the matrix has a structured subsection, and every subsection maps to a
  matrix row.
- Confirm every attack subsection uses the same seven-field template (Adversary,
  Attack, Assets at risk, Platform control, Verification hook, Status, Residual
  risk / evidence) and that each Status is drawn from the fixed vocabulary
  (Prevented / Detectable / Mitigated / Residual / Out of scope), consistently with
  the matrix.

## 3. Honesty and overclaiming

- The real-genome studies must be framed as aggregate-only workflow demonstrations
  on public reference data — NOT biomedical validation or population-genetics
  estimates.
- The F_ST-like and LD `r2` values must be labeled simplified small-panel contrasts;
  the E8 `r2` = 1.0000 pair must be flagged as a small-count artifact; the
  below-quorum E8 caveat (25 samples < floor of 30) must be present.
- The certificate honesty box must state that the certificate binds artifacts and
  policy facts and does NOT by itself prove correct computation, correct decryption,
  contributor identity, or bounded output-privacy leakage.
- Flag any sentence that claims more than the evidence supports.

## 4. Citation and cross-reference integrity

- Every reference R1-R37 is both defined and cited, with no gaps or orphans.
- Every "Section N", "Table N", and "Figure N" reference resolves to the right
  target; tables are numbered 1-16 and figures 1-8; the Appendix A index matches the
  body.

## 5. Reproducibility

- The paper gives a concrete, runnable reproduction path (Appendix B); the commands
  exist; the open CLI, open applications, and public data are sufficient to
  reproduce every result without the hosted service. Optionally run the `replicate`
  skill and confirm the numbers.

## 6. Scope and framing

- The contribution claims (Section 2) are supported and appropriately bounded.
- The threat model's assumptions are stated.
- The limitations are acknowledged: single keyholder, metadata leakage,
  output-privacy as the largest residual risk, and synthetic-plus-small-real
  evidence.